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THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
WAR ON TERRORISM 
Erwin Chemerinsky* 
It is now three and a half years since the tragic day of September 11.  
For a war, this is a relatively long period of time.  World War II, for 
example, lasted only slightly longer, and three and a half years is longer 
than the amount of time that the United States was involved in World 
War I.  It is certainly long enough to provide an opportunity for evaluating 
how the federal courts have done so far in balancing civil liberties with 
fighting the war on terrorism. 
My thesis is that federal district courts have generally done better than 
the federal courts of appeals with regard to protecting civil liberties.  In 
many instances, the federal district courts have ruled against the 
government and in favor of civil liberties, only to be overruled by the 
United States courts of appeals.  To this point, there have been only three 
Supreme Court decisions concerning civil liberties and the war on 
terrorism, and they are mixed in terms of their results.  So it is much harder 
to come to conclusions about the Supreme Court.1  Besides, while there has 
been a great deal of attention paid to the Supreme Court’s rulings, far too 
little attention has been paid to what the lower courts have done so far. 
In this article, I focus primarily on the lower federal courts and their 
protection of civil liberties in the war on terrorism.  I make three points.  
First,  over the course of American history, in times of crisis the country has 
compromised civil liberties and only later come to recognize that the losses 
                                                 
*  Alston & Bird Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. 
1 Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004) (holding that United States courts have jurisdiction to 
consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad in 
connection with hostilities and incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. 
Ct. 2633 (2004) (holding that the United States may detain an American citizen apprehended in 
Afghanistan and brought to the United States as an enemy combatant, but the government 
must accord the individual a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that 
decision before a neutral decisionmaker); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004) (holding 
that an American citizen arrested in the United States for a crime in the United States held as 
an enemy combatant must bring his challenge in the federal judicial district where he is held). 
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of rights were tragic mistakes.  This historical context is crucial in evaluating 
what has occurred since September 11.  Second, I evaluate  the federal 
courts’ response since September 11 in cases involving civil liberties and the 
war on terrorism and demonstrate that the federal district courts have 
generally done better than the United States courts of appeals in protecting 
civil liberties.  Third, I offer some tentative thoughts as to why this might be 
so. 
I.  THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Since September 11, 2001, one of the worst aspects of American history 
has been repeating itself.  For over two hundred years, repression has been 
the response to threats to security.  In hindsight, every such instance was 
clearly a grave error that restricted our most precious freedoms for no 
apparent gain.  I have no doubt that the actions of the Bush Administration 
and the Ashcroft Justice Department will, in hindsight, be viewed in the 
same way. 
The legacy of suppression in times of crisis began early in American 
history.  In 1798, in response to concerns about survival of the country, 
Congress enacted the Alien and Sedition Act which made it a federal crime 
to make false criticisms of the government or its officials.2  The law was 
used to persecute the government’s critics and people were jailed for what 
today would be regarded as the mildest of statements.  Within a few years, 
after the election of 1800, Congress repealed the law and President Thomas 
Jefferson pardoned those who had been convicted.  The right to freedom of 
speech was lost and nothing was gained. 
During the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ 
of habeas corpus.  Additionally, dissidents were imprisoned for criticizing 
the way the government was fighting the war.  There is no evidence that 
this aided the fighting of the Civil War in any way.  Ultimately, the 
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional Lincoln’s suspension of the writ 
of habeas corpus.3 
During World War I, the government aggressively prosecuted critics of 
the war.  One man went to jail for ten years for circulating a leaflet arguing 
that the draft was unconstitutional;4 another, Socialist leader Eugene Debs, 
was sentenced to prison for simply saying to his audience, “You are good 
                                                 
2 Sediation Act of July 14, 1798, 1 Stat. 596 (1798). 
3  Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866). 
4 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
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for more than cannon fodder.”5  At about the same time, the successful 
Bolshevik revolution in Russia sparked great fear of communism in the 
United States.  The U.S. Attorney General, Mitchell Palmer, launched a 
massive effort to round up and deport aliens in the United States.  
Individuals were summarily deported and separated from their families 
without any semblance of due process.   
During World War II, 110,000 Japanese-Americans were forcibly 
interned in what President Franklin Roosevelt called “concentration 
camps.”6  Adults and children, aliens and citizens, were uprooted from their 
lifelong homes and placed behind barbed wire.  Not one Japanese-
American was ever charged with espionage, treason, or any other crime 
that threatened security.  There is no evidence that the unprecedented 
invasion of rights accomplished anything useful.  Nonetheless, the Supreme 
Court, in Korematsu v. United States,7 expressed the need for deference to the 
executive  in wartime and upheld the removal of Japanese-Americans from 
the west coast.8 
The McCarthy era saw enormous persecution of suspected communists. 
Jobs were lost and lives were ruined on the flimsiest of allegations.  In the 
leading case during the era, United States v. Dennis,9 the Court approved a 
twenty-year prison sentence for the crime of “conspiracy to organize the 
Communist party and to teach and advocate the overthrow of the 
government” by teaching the works of Marx and Lenin.10 
This brief recitation of history should give pause to any efforts to take 
away civil liberties in this new time of crisis.  It is crucial to appraise what 
has occurred since September 11 in this context. 
II.  COMPARING THE DISTRICT COURTS AND THE COURTS OF APPEALS IN 
BALANCING CIVIL LIBERTIES AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
There now have been many cases challenging aspects of the United 
States government’s war on terrorism.  An interesting pattern is emerging:  
Federal district courts are often more protective of civil liberties than the 
United States courts of appeals.  There are a number of cases where district 
court rulings in favor of civil liberties have been overruled by the courts of 
                                                 
5 Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 214 (1919). 
6 WILLIAM MANCHESTER, THE GLORY AND THE DREAM 300 (1974). 
7 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
8 Id. at 223. 
9 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
10 Id. at 517. 
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appeals, but there are almost no rulings where district court decisions in 
favor of the government have been overruled.11 
To develop this thesis, I give five examples where the district courts 
ruled for civil liberties only to be reversed by the court of appeals.  I 
intentionally have chosen these from five different circuits so that it will not 
seem that this trend is the product of one circuit’s views. 
A.  D.C. Circuit:  Center for National Security Studies v. United States 
Department of Justice 
How many individuals were arrested and detained by the federal 
government after September 11?  How many individuals are now being 
detained?  Who are the detainees and why are they being held?  
Astoundingly, the answers to these questions remain unknown.  The Bush 
Administration and the Justice Department have steadfastly refused to 
answer these basic inquiries, so that no one knows how many people have 
been held in custody and for what reasons.  A federal district court ruled in 
favor of the plaintiffs in a lawsuit that would have provided much of this 
information, but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
reversed.  On January 12, 2004, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.  The 
effect of the Court’s denial of review in Center for National Security Studies v. 
United States Department of Justice12 is that there is no way to learn the most 
basic information about the government’s actions in the last two and a half 
years. 
The lawsuit was brought by a coalition of public interest groups, 
including the Center for National Security Studies, the ACLU, People for 
the American Way, the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 
and Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.  As the district court 
explained, the lawsuit resulted from the fact that “the Government refused 
to make public the number of people arrested, their names, their lawyers, 
the reasons for their detention, and other information relating to their 
whereabouts and circumstances.”13  
                                                 
11 One case where the court of appeals did reverse the district court and was more 
protective of civil liberties was Gherebi v. Bush, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (C.D. Cal. 2003), rev’d 352 
F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2003), granted, vacated and remanded by 124 S. Ct. 2932 (2004), where the 
Ninth Circuit held that the federal court had jurisdiction to hear a habeas corpus petition by a 
detainee at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 
12 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004). 
13 Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94, 96 (D.D.C. 
2002). 
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The plaintiffs sued seeking basic information, including the following:  
the identities of those being held and the circumstances of their arrest, 
including the dates of any arrest and release and the nature of any charges 
filed against them; the identities of lawyers representing any of these 
individuals; the identity of any courts that were requested to enter any 
sealing orders with regard to proceedings against these individuals; and all 
policy directives issued to government officials about these individuals and 
what may be said to the press about them. 
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia largely 
ruled in favor of the plaintiffs based on the Freedom of Information Act 
(“FOIA”).  The district court ordered the Department of Justice to disclose 
the names of the detainees, the identity of counsel representing detainees, 
and any policy directives to government officials about making public 
statements or disclosures regarding the detainees.  The district court, 
however, held that the Department of Justice did not have to reveal the 
dates and locations of arrest, detention, and release.  The most significant 
effect of the district court’s order is that we finally would know how many 
people are being detained and, by contacting them, why they are being held 
and how they are being treated.  Only through this information can it be 
learned if the government has significantly abused its power to arrest and 
detain individuals. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
reversed in a 2-1 decision.14  The court of appeals decision repeatedly 
emphasized the need for great deference to the Executive Branch.  For 
example, the court said that “the judiciary is in an extremely poor position 
to second-guess the executive’s judgment in this area of national security” 
and that the “need for deference in this case is just as strong as in earlier 
cases.  America faces an enemy just as real as its former Cold War foes, with 
capabilities beyond the capacity of the judiciary to explore.”15 
Specifically, the court of appeals rejected the argument that there is a 
First Amendment right to the information and concluded that the 
information is protected from disclosure under exemption 7(A) of the FOIA, 
which exempts from disclosure information that “could reasonably be 
expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings.”16  Specifically, the 
court accepted the government’s argument “that disclosure of the detainees’ 
names would enable al Qaeda or other terrorist groups to map the course of 
the investigation and thus the means to impede it. . . .  Moreover, disclosure 
                                                 
14 Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 918. 
15 Id. at 928. 
16 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A, C &  F) (2000). 
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would inform terrorists of which members were compromised and which 
were not.”17  The court said that the names of attorneys should not be 
disclosed because that could lead to learning the identity of those detained.   
The court of appeals decision is wrong as a matter of law and policy, 
and therefore it is very unfortunate that the Supreme Court denied review.  
First, there is no basis for believing that revealing the number held or their 
names would compromise investigations in any way.  For example, there is 
no imaginable reason why the government will not disclose the number of 
people who have been held as material witnesses.  Nor is the government’s 
argument against disclosing the names even logical.  Terrorist organizations 
surely know which of their members have been arrested.  Disclosing the 
names of those individuals arrested who are not affiliated with terrorism 
will not provide terrorist organizations with any useful information.  Nor is 
there  any privacy interest in keeping the names secret; the identity of those 
arrested is usually a matter of public record. 
Second, the court of appeals expressed a degree of nearly complete 
deference to the executive that is inconsistent with the text and purpose of 
the FOIA, which creates a strong presumption in favor of disclosing 
government records.  As Judge Tatel expressed in his dissent to the court of 
appeals decision:  “the court’s uncritical deference to the government’s 
vague, poorly explained arguments for withholding broad categories of 
information about the detainees, as well as its willingness to fill in the 
factual and logical gaps in the government’s case, eviscerates both FOIA 
itself and the principles of openness in government that FOIA embodies.”18 
As Judge Tatel powerfully declared, “this court has converted deference 
into acquiescence.”19 
Third, the court of appeals erred by giving no weight to the strong 
public interest in learning how the government has used its power to arrest 
and detain individuals.  The plaintiffs alleged that the government has 
abused its powers by wrongly detaining hundreds or thousands of 
individuals, many solely because of their religion or ethnicity.  The 
government is preventing scrutiny of its conduct by invoking secrecy.  As 
Judge Tatel expressed:  “[j]ust as the government has a compelling interest 
in ensuring citizens’ safety, so do citizens have a compelling interest in 
                                                 
17 Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 928. 
18 Id. at 937 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
19 Id. at 938. 
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ensuring that their government does not, in discharging its duties, abuse 
one of its most awesome powers, the power to arrest and jail.”20 
A couple of years ago, I debated Michael Chertoff, then the Assistant 
Attorney General for the Criminal Division and now Secretary of the 
Department of Homeland Security.  I asked him how many people have 
been held, particularly as material witnesses.  He said that he could not 
disclose the information because of national security.  I asked how knowing 
the number held, whether it is dozens or hundreds or thousands, could 
reveal anything remotely harmful to national security.  There was no 
answer. 
The Supreme Court should have granted certiorari in Center for National 
Security Studies v. United States Department of Justice to protect the right to 
information under the First Amendment and the FOIA.  Secrecy of the sort 
claimed by the Bush Administration and the Ashcroft Justice Department 
hides and encourages serious abuses of power.  Again, the government has 
applied its traditional powers for secrecy regarding national security to 
domestic law enforcement. 
B. Second Circuit:  United States v. Awadallah 
Apparently, many individuals have been detained since September 11 
as “material witnesses.”  The law does not accord the government 
unlimited discretion to hold individuals as material witnesses.  Federal law 
sets both substantive and procedural requirements for holding an 
individual as a material witness.  The federal material witness law, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3144, permits the government to arrest a material witness if there exists 
probable cause both that (1) the person has information material to a 
criminal proceeding and (2) at trial it may become impractical to secure the 
presence of the person by subpoena.21  Section 3144 requires an affidavit 
demonstrating probable cause as to both of these elements and necessitates 
a warrant prior to arrest.  The impracticality inquiry is a fact-based analysis 
focusing on the witness’ ties to the community such as residency, 
employment, family, and the strength of each of these ties.22  I have heard 
many reports of individuals being arrested and imprisoned, not for any 
crimes they committed, but as material witnesses for grand jury 
proceedings.  A federal district court in New York concluded that a grand 
jury proceeding is not a “criminal proceeding” for purposes of § 3144.  In 
                                                 
20 Id. 
21 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000). 
22 See Perkins v. Click, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (D.N.M. 2001). 
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United States v. Awadallah,23 the district court ruled that the material witness 
statute could not be used to detain grand jury witnesses.  The district court 
carefully reviewed the statute, its legislative history, and its uses and 
concluded that the government had no authority to use the law to detain 
individuals as material witnesses for grand jury proceedings. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and 
broadly construed the government’s power to detain material witnesses.24  
The court held that it was permissible to hold the defendant for several 
weeks as a material witness without taking his deposition or testimony 
during this time.  This is a tremendous expansion of the power of the 
government to hold—indeed to imprison—individuals.  The government 
was holding a person in prison even though there was no probable cause to 
arrest the person or to suspect the person of committing any crime.  
Unfortunately, in January 2005, the Supreme Court denied review.25 
C. Third Circuit:  North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft 
Since September 11, proceedings involving detainees have been closed 
to an unprecedented extent.  This raises grave issues concerning the 
protection of the rights of detainees, as well as the rights of the press and 
the public.   
On September 21, 2001, Chief Immigration Judge Creppy issued a 
memorandum to all immigration judges and court administrators, 
explaining that “the Attorney General has implemented additional security 
procedures for certain cases in the Immigration Court.”26  Among other 
procedures, judges are supposed to close the hearing to the public and 
avoid disclosing any information about the case to anyone outside the 
immigration court.  The memorandum also restricts immigration officials 
from confirming or denying whether any particular case exists on the 
docket.27  Essentially, Creppy imposed a blanket secrecy requirement for 
“cases requiring special procedures.” 
This order is at odds with federal regulations that require openness of 
immigration proceedings.  Specifically, 8 C.F.R. § 3.27 provides:   
                                                 
23 202 F. Supp. 2d 82 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
24 United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003). 
25 Awadallah v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 861 (2005). 
26 Memorandum from Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy, to all immigration judges 
and court administrators (September 21, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/ 
ocij/oppm99/99_3.pdf. 
27 See, e.g., id. at Procedure 5 (“This restriction on information includes confirming or 
denying whether such a case is on the docket or scheduled for hearing.”). 
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All hearings, other than exclusion hearings, shall be open 
to the public, except that: (a) depending upon physical 
facilities, the Immigration Judge may place reasonable 
limitations upon the number in attendance at any one time 
with priority being given to the press over the general 
public; and (b) for the purpose of protecting witnesses, 
parties, or the public interest, the Immigration Judge may 
limit attendance or hold a closed hearing.28   
Additionally, 8 C.F.R. § 240.10(b) provides that “removal hearings shall 
be open to the public, except that the immigration judge may, in his or her 
discretion, close proceedings as provided in § 3.27 of this chapter.”29  Thus, 
there is a strong presumption of openness under federal regulations.  
The Supreme Court never has determined whether there is a First 
Amendment right of access to immigration proceedings.  In Richmond 
Newspapers v. Virginia,30 the Supreme Court held that the press and the 
public have a First Amendment right to attend criminal trials.  The Court 
emphasized that openness helps to ensure fair proceedings, as well as 
fulfilling the right of people to know what their government is doing.31    
In Press Enterprise v. Superior Court,32 the Supreme Court said that the 
following two-part test is to be used in determining whether there is a right 
to attend government proceedings:  (1) whether there is a tradition of access 
to the proceedings; and (2) whether public access plays a significant positive 
role in the functioning of the particular process.  There is a tradition of open 
immigration proceedings as federal regulations have long required that 
they be open to the press and public except in narrow circumstances.  Also, 
openness of immigration proceedings provides the same benefits as 
openness of criminal trials in helping to ensure a just and fair process.  
The Court in Press Enterprise said that closure of proceedings is 
permissible only if it is “essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly 
tailored to serve that interest.”33  Immigration proceedings should be closed 
only if there is a demonstrated need for secrecy in the specific case.  Blanket 
closure, as has been imposed, is not desirable. 
                                                 
28 8 C.F.R. § 3.27 (2003). 
29 Id. § 240.10(b) (2003). 
30 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
31 Id. at 569-70. 
32 478 U.S. 1 (1986). 
33 Id. at 9. 
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A federal district court in New Jersey concluded that the Creppy memo 
violated the First Amendment.34  This was in accord with a ruling of a 
United States District Court in Michigan,35 which was affirmed by the Sixth 
Circuit in Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft.36  A suit was brought by the press, as 
well as Congressman John Conyers, when the deportation hearings of 
Rabih Haddad were closed.  The district court declared that “[o]penness is 
necessary for the public to maintain confidence in the value and soundness 
of the government’s actions, as secrecy only breeds suspicion as to why the 
government is proceeding against Haddad and aliens like him.”37  The court 
concluded that the government’s policy violates the First Amendment and 
noted that there is a long tradition of open court proceedings and 
administrative hearings, including deportation hearings.  The court 
recognized that the right to open proceedings is not absolute, but held that 
closure is permissible only if strict scrutiny is met. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed and 
wrote:  
Against non-citizens, [the Executive Branch] seeks the 
power to secretly deport a class if it unilaterally calls them 
‘special interest’ cases.  The Executive Branch seeks to 
uproot people’s lives, outside the public eye, and behind a 
closed door.  Democracies die behind closed doors.  The 
First Amendment, through a free press, protects the 
people’s right to know that their government acts fairly, 
lawfully, and accurately in deportation proceedings.  
When the government begins closing doors, it selectively 
controls information rightfully belonging to the people.  
Selective information is misinformation.  The Framers of 
the First Amendment did not trust any government to 
separate the true from the false for us.  They protected the 
people against secret government.38 
The Sixth Circuit held that the government may not impose blanket 
closure of a class of immigration proceedings, but instead must demonstrate 
the need for closure in a specific case. 
                                                 
34 North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.J. 2002). 
35 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 221 F. Supp. 2d 799 (E.D. Mich. 2002). 
36 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002). 
37 Detroit Free Press, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 805. 
38 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 683. 
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, however, 
came to an opposite conclusion and reversed the New Jersey district court 
in New Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft.39  The Third Circuit held that 
newspapers did not have a First Amendment right of access to deportation 
proceedings that were determined by the Attorney General to present 
significant national security concerns.  The court said that there was not a 
sufficient history of open immigration proceedings to create a First 
Amendment right for the press to attend and that there was a risk that 
seemingly innocuous information could be used as part of a “mosaic” to aid 
terrorists. 
D. Fourth Circuit:  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 
Ysarr Hamdi is an American citizen who was apprehended in 
Afghanistan allegedly for fighting for the enemy.  His situation is thus 
identical to that of John Walker Lindh.  Like Lindh, Hamdi was brought to 
the United States and was held in a military prison in South Carolina.  
Unlike Lindh, the United States government had not filed charges against 
Hamdi and claimed that it could hold him forever as an enemy combatant. 
The federal district court ruled that Hamdi had a right to consult with 
his attorney, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
reversed.40  The district court then promulgated a series of questions for the 
government to answer to justify holding Hamdi as an enemy combatant.  
Once more, the Fourth Circuit reversed.41  The court concluded that the 
President has broad power, as Commander-in-Chief, to detain as enemy 
combatants individuals, including United States citizens, apprehended in a 
foreign country during battle, and that the court’s power is limited under 
such circumstances to determining that a detention is a lawful exercise of 
the President’s war-making powers. 
Unlike the other cases discussed in this article, the Supreme Court 
granted review in the Hamdi case.42  There were two issues before the 
Supreme Court.  First, does the federal government have the authority to 
hold an American citizen apprehended in a foreign country as an enemy 
combatant?  In a 5-4 ruling, the Court decided in favor of the government.  
Justice O’Connor wrote the plurality opinion, which was joined by Chief 
                                                 
39 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002). 
40 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002). 
41 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003). 
42 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).  The Court did not review whether Hamdi had 
a right to consult with a lawyer.  The day its opposition to certiorari was due, the government 
agreed to allow Hamdi to consult with an attorney, thus making that issue moot. 
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Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Breyer.  Hamdi contended that 
his detention violated the Non-Detention Act, which states that “[n]o citizen 
shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except 
pursuant to an Act of Congress.”43  
But the plurality concluded that Hamdi’s detention was authorized 
pursuant to an act of Congress:  the Authorization for Use of Military Force 
that was passed after September 11.44  Justice O’Connor stated that this 
constituted sufficient congressional authorization to meet the requirements 
of the Non-Detention Act and to permit detaining an American citizen 
apprehended in a foreign country as an enemy combatant.  Justice Thomas 
was the fifth vote for the government on this issue and in a separate opinion 
he concluded that the President has inherent authority, pursuant to 
Article II of the Constitution to hold Hamdi as an enemy combatant.45 
The other four Justices vehemently disagreed.  Justice Souter, in an 
opinion joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part, contended that it violates the Non-Detention Act to hold 
an American citizen as an enemy combatant.46  These two Justices disagreed 
with the plurality’s claim that the resolution authorizing the use of military 
force after September 11 was sufficient to meet the requirements of the Non-
Detention Act.  In a powerful dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia, joined by 
Justice Stevens, argued that there is no authority to hold an American 
citizen in the United States as an enemy combatant without charges or trial, 
unless Congress expressly suspends the writ of habeas corpus.47   
The second issue before the Court was what, if any, process must be 
accorded to Hamdi?  The Court ruled 8-1, with only Justice Thomas 
dissenting, that Hamdi must be accorded due process.  Justice O’Connor 
explained that Hamdi is entitled to have his habeas petition heard in federal 
court and that imprisoning a person is obviously the most basic form of 
deprivation of liberty.  Thus, due process is required and the procedures 
required are to be determined by applying the three-part balancing test 
under Mathews v. Eldridge,48 which instructs courts to weigh the importance 
                                                 
43 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000). 
44 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). On 
September 14, 2001, Congress authorized the President “to use all necessary and appropriate 
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such 
organizations or persons . . . .” Authorization for Use of Military Force, § 2(a). 
45 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2674 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
46 Id. at 2652 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
47 Id. at 2660 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
48 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
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of the interest to the individual, the ability of additional procedures to 
reduce the risk of an erroneous deprivation, and the government’s interests. 
Although the Court did not specify the procedures which must be 
followed in Hamdi’s case, the Justices were explicit that Hamdi must be 
given a meaningful factual hearing.  At a minimum, this includes notice of 
the charges, the right to respond, and the right to be represented by an 
attorney.  The Court, however, suggested that hearsay evidence might be 
admissible and the burden of proof could even be placed on Hamdi.  Only 
Justice Thomas rejected this conclusion and accepted the government’s 
argument that the President could detain enemy combatants without any 
form of due process. 
In November 2004, the Bush administration reached a deal with Hamdi. 
In exchange for him renouncing his American citizenship and promising 
never to return to this country or take up arms against it, Hamdi was 
released from custody.  Thus, this case will not be the vehicle for resolving 
the undecided questions concerning what procedures must be followed 
when the government detains an American citizen apprehended in a 
foreign country. 
E. Ninth Circuit:  United States v. Afshari 
A recent Ninth Circuit decision, United States v. Afshari,49 is very 
disturbing because it allows the government to punish people for activities 
protected by the First Amendment and denies the individuals the chance 
even to argue that their conduct is constitutionally protected.  The case 
arises from the criminal indictment of Roya Rahmani and six other 
individuals for providing material support to a group that the Secretary of 
State has designated as a “foreign terrorist organization.”  They were 
indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B for raising and giving money to MEK 
(Mujahedin-e Khalq), the main opposition to the fundamentalist regime in 
Iran.  
The defendants claimed that MEK is not a terrorist organization and 
sought to prove this as their defense to the charges against them.  If MEK is 
not a terrorist organization, then contributions to it are protected by the 
First Amendment.  Federal law, however, precludes the defendants from 
challenging the designation of MEK.  The federal statute provides that 
when a group is designated by the Secretary of State as a terrorist 
organization, review of the designation is possible only in a challenge 
brought by the organization in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
                                                 
49 392 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2004).  A petition for en banc review is now pending. 
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District of Columbia Circuit.   Thus, those prosecuted under the statute for 
aiding a “terrorist organization” cannot bring a challenge to the 
designation, even though the designation is the basis for the prosecution.  
The defendants claimed that their donation was protected by the First 
Amendment’s guarantees of freedom of speech and association. 
The United States District Court for the Central District of California 
declared it unconstitutional to punish individuals for contributing to a 
terrorist organization without giving them the opportunity to challenge the 
organization’s designation.50  Although there is no First Amendment right 
to contribute money to a terrorist organization,51 there is a First 
Amendment right to donate and solicit for an organization that is not a 
terrorist organization.  Whether an entity meets the requirements for being 
deemed a terrorist organization is a factual question and should not be 
deemed true simply because an executive official says so. 
Unfortunately, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
reversed the district court in an opinion by Judge Kleinfeld.  The effect of 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision is that individuals can be prosecuted for 
activities that are protected by the First Amendment withouth having an 
opportunity to litigate their First Amendment claims.  That just cannot be 
right. 
This is particularly troubling in the context of the statute and the facts of 
the case decided by the Ninth Circuit.  The statute, which was the basis for 
the prosecution, is enormously broad in its definition of terrorist activity.  
The statute requires a threat to national security, which includes the 
“economic interests of the United States”52 and includes any threat to use a 
firearm against any person or property, anywhere in the world, except for 
personal monetary gain.  There is no limit to what groups might be deemed 
terrorist organizations under this statute and contributors to these groups 
would face up to fifteen years in prison.  The Secretary of State thus has 
broad latitude in deciding which groups are to be deemed “terrorist 
organizations.” 
In the Afshari case, it is understandable why the defendants would want 
the chance to prove that MEK is not a terrorist organization.  MEK is the 
only major Muslim organization in the Middle East that supports the 
Middle East peace process.  It has aided the United States in terrorism 
investigations.  In 1998 and again in 2002, hundreds of members of the 
                                                 
50 United States v. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
51 Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). 
52 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c)(2) (2000). 
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United States House of Representatives issued statements calling the MEK a 
legitimate opposition to the repressive Iranian regime. 
The defendants who are indicted with aiding a terrorist organization 
simply want the chance to refute the charge by showing that the entity is 
not involved with terrorism and thus that their contributions and fund 
raising activities are protected by the First Amendment.  In fact, there is 
Supreme Court precedent on point which clearly indicates that it is 
unconstitutional to preclude the defendants from challenging the basis for 
the prosecution against them.  In McKinney v. Alabama,53 the Supreme Court 
declared unconstitutional an Alabama statute that allowed an Alabama 
prosecutor to establish a work to be obscene in one case and then in 
subsequent prosecutions against different defendants, to preclude 
relitigation of the earlier judicial designation of obscenity.  In other words, 
under the Alabama law, the defendant had no right to challenge the 
underlying judicial determination of obscenity or to argue that the material 
was not obscene. 
The Supreme Court declared this unconstitutional and stressed that 
those prosecuted have a First Amendment right to challenge the basis for 
their prosecution.  The Court explained that “the procedures utilized by the 
State of Alabama, insofar as they precluded [the proprietor] from litigating 
the obscenity [of the particular works] violated the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.”54   
There is an obvious parallel between the law in McKinney and the 
statute at issue in the recent Ninth Circuit case.  Both decisions involved 
statutes that precluded litigants from challenging the predicate for their 
criminal prosecutions.  In McKinney, this was declared unconstitutional, but 
in Afshari it was upheld.  McKinney makes it clear that the First Amendment 
rights of a criminal defendant are not adequately protected just because 
there are other individuals who have an incentive to litigate the matter.  The 
point of McKinney is that a criminal defendant has the right, particularly in 
a First Amendment case, to challenge the legal basis for his prosecution and 
to disprove any of the elements of the government’s case. 
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit erred in not recognizing the serious due 
process problems with the designation process.  Although designating an 
organization a terrorist has profound consequences, including criminal 
penalties for those who aid the organization, there is no process where 
                                                 
53 424 U.S. 669 (1976). 
54 Id. at 673. 
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individuals can challenge the basis for their prosecutions.  This complete 
absence of any form of process is a violation of the Constitution. 
The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Afshari has troubling implications.  There 
would be nothing to stop the government from establishing any fact in one 
proceeding and then using that fact as a basis for a criminal prosecution of a 
different individual.  This flies in the face of due process, which prohibits a 
person from being bound if he or she was not a party to a prior action.  
Afshari is another example of liberties being lost as part of the war on 
terrorism and of a district court protecting rights more than the court of 
appeals, but the last chapter in this story is not yet written.  The defendants 
are seeking en banc review in the Ninth Circuit.   The court should grant it 
and make clear that defendants must be accorded the right to show that 
their speech is protected by the First Amendment.  Failing that, the 
Supreme Court should grant review and make clear that those prosecuted 
for their speech and political activities must be allowed to demonstrate that 
their speech is constitutionally protected. 
F. The Future 
There are a number of other cases where federal district courts have 
ruled in favor of civil liberties and where it will be interesting to see if this 
trend of court of appeals reversals continues.  In Doe v. Ashcroft, the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, declared 
unconstitutional the practice of the government obtaining confidential 
information by issuing “national security letters.”55  In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that the 
military tribunals created by the Bush Administration violated American 
and international law.56  In In re Guantanamo Detainees Cases, a federal 
district court judge ruled that those detained in Guantanamo have stated a 
claim upon which relief can be granted and thus denied the government’s 
motion to dismiss.57 
III.  WHY? 
The cases described above all involve situations in which the district 
courts ruled in favor of civil liberties and were reversed by the courts of 
appeals.  Perhaps five cases are not enough to constitute a trend worth 
                                                 
55 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
56 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004). 
57 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005).  Another district court in the District of Columbia came 
to an opposite conclusion see In re Guantanamo Detainees Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d 174 (D.D.C. 
2004).  Both cases are now on appeal to the D.C. Circuit. 
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discussing.  Maybe it is just the luck of the draw in these five cases that the 
district court judges happened to be sensitive towards civil liberties and the 
court of appeals judges in the cases were more inclined towards protecting 
national security. 
However, I intentionally chose cases from five different circuits to make 
it harder to dismiss the cases as anecdotal.  Might there be other 
explanations besides coincidence?  One possibility is that it says something 
about the method of judicial selection.  The White House generally chooses 
federal court of appeals judges, whereas Senators play a key role in 
selecting district court judges.  Thus, it is to be expected that ideology 
generally plays a much larger role in picking court of appeals judges than in 
selecting district court judges.  At this point, sixty percent of the federal 
court of appeals judges—94 of 162—are Republican appointees.  
Another possible explanation, not at all mutually exclusive, is based on 
the role orientation of the judges.  District judges perceive their roles as, and 
are much more accustomed to, evaluating the credibility of the evidence 
before them.  The courts of appeals, which are less in the business of 
evaluating the credibility of witnesses, have been much more willing to 
defer to the government.  This, too, could explain why district courts, more 
than courts of appeals, have rejected the government’s claim of the need to 
take away civil liberties for the sake of national security. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There is much to say about civil liberties and the war on terrorism.  In 
this article I have made a limited point, but one that seems to have been 
overlooked:  federal district courts have generally done a better job in 
protecting civil liberties in the war on terrorism than the courts of appeals. 
The late Justice Louis Brandeis wrote:  
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to 
protect liberty when the government’s purposes are 
beneficent.  Men born to freedom are naturally alert to 
repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers.  The 
greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment 
by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.58 
Louis Brandeis, of course, never knew John Ashcroft or Donald 
Rumsfeld, but if he had, he could not have chosen a more apt description. 
                                                 
58 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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